صفحه 1:
William Stallings
Data and Computer
Communications
Chapter 18
Network Security
صفحه 2:
Security Requirements
I Confidentiality
0 Integrity
0 Availability
صفحه 3:
Passive Attacks
I Eavesdropping on transmissions
0 To obtain information
0 Release of message contents
! Outsider learns content of transmission
0 Traffic analysis
! By monitoring frequency and length of
messages, even encrypted, nature of
communication may be guessed
0 Difficult to detect
0 Can be prevented
صفحه 4:
Active Attacks
0 Masquerade
I Pretending to be a different entity
Replay
Modification of messages
Denial of service
Easy to detect
I Detection may lead to deterrent
0 Hard to prevent
ooo e8
صفحه 5:
Security Threats
Passive Threats Active Threats
Release of ‘Traffic Masquerade Replay
message contents analysis
صفحه 6:
Conventional Encryption
Secret key shared by Secret key shared by
sender and recipient sender 5 recipient
Transmitted
ای
>
Plaintext encryption algorithm Decryption algorithm —Pisintext
input output
(reverse of encryption
algorithm)
(eg, DE
صفحه 7:
Ingredients
0 Plain text
0 Encryption algorithm
0 Secret key
0 Cipher text
1 Decryption algorithm
صفحه 8:
Requirements for Security
0 Strong encryption algorithm
۱ Even if known, should not be able to decrypt or
work out key
I Even if a number of cipher texts are available
together with plain texts of them
0 Sender and receiver must obtain secret
key securely
0 Once key is known, all communication
using this key is readable
صفحه 9:
Attacking Encryption
0 Crypt analysis
I Relay on nature of algorithm plus some
knowledge of general characteristics of plain
text
I Attempt to deduce plain text or key
0 Brute force
I Try every possible key until plain text is
achieved
صفحه 10:
Algorithms
0 Block cipher
I Process plain text in fixed block sizes
producing block of cipher text of equal size
I Data encryption standard (DES)
I Triple DES (TDES)
صفحه 11:
Data Encryption Standard
0 US standard
0 64 bit plain text blocks
0 56 bit key
صفحه 12:
Permuted Choice 1
Left circular shit
Leh cireular shift
Permmuted Choice 2
Permuted Choice 2
Peemuted Choice 2
! ۲
(41-bit plaintext
32-bit Swap
Tnverse Initial
Permutation
ciphertext اج
صفحه 13:
DES Single
Iteration
i
صفحه 14:
Strength of DES
0 Declared insecure in 1998
0 Electronic Frontier Foundation
0 DES Cracker machine
0 DES now worthless
0 Alternatives include TDEA
صفحه 15:
Triple DEA
0 ANSI X9.17 (1985)
0 Incorporated in DEA standard 1999
0 Uses 3 keys and 3 executions of DEA
algorithm
0 Effective key length 168 bit
صفحه 16:
Location of Encryption Devices
صفحه 17:
Link Encryption
I Each communication link equipped at both
ends
All traffic secure
High level of security
Requires lots of encryption devices
Message must be decrypted at each switch
to read address (virtual circuit number)
0 Security vulnerable at switches
I Particularly on public switched network
كرابم جك
صفحه 18:
End to End Encryption
[ Encryption done at ends of system
0 Data in encrypted form crosses network
unaltered
0 Destination shares key with source to decrypt
0 Host can only encrypt user data
! Otherwise switching nodes could not read header
or route packet
1 Traffic pattern not secure
0 Use both link and end to end
صفحه 19:
Key Distribution
ص
Key selected by A and delivered to B
Third party selects key and delivers to A
and B
Use old key to encrypt and transmit new
key from A to B
Use old key to transmit new key from third
party to A and B
ص
ص
ص
صفحه 20:
Automatic Key Distribution (diag)
1 -
KDC= key
ع
1091
HOST
أه - سما اس سس سا
network
صفحه 21:
Automatic Key Distribution
I Session Key
1 Used for duration of one logical connection
| Destroyed at end of session
I Used for user data
0 Permanent key
I Used for distribution of keys
0 Key distribution center
۱ Determines which systems may communicate
I Provides one session key for that connection
0 Front end processor
| Performs end to end encryption
1 Obtains keys for host
صفحه 22:
Traffic Padding
0 Produce cipher text continuously
0 If no plain text to encode, send random
data
0 Make traffic analysis impossible
صفحه 23:
Message Authentication
0 Protection against active attacks
I Falsification of data
۱ Eavesdropping
0 Message is authentic if it is genuine and
comes from the alleged source
0 Authentication allows receiver to verify
that message is authentic
۱ Message has not altered
۱ Message is from authentic source
I Message timeline
صفحه 24:
Authentication Using Encryption
Assumes sender and receiver are only
entities that know key
Message includes:
! error detection code
I sequence number
I time stamp
ص
ص
صفحه 25:
Authentication Without Encryption
0 Authentication tag generated and
appended to each message
0 Message not encrypted
0 Useful for:
I Messages broadcast to multiple destinations
| Have one destination responsible for authentication
I One side heavily loaded
Encryption adds to workload
0 Can authenticate random messages
I Programs authenticated without encryption can
be executed without decoding
صفحه 26:
Message Authentication Code
0 Generate authentication code based on
shared key and message
Common key shared between A and B
0 If only sender and receiver know key and
code matches:
! Receiver assured message has not altered
I Receiver assured message is from alleged
sender
I If message has sequence number, receiver
assured of proper sequence
صفحه 27:
Message Authentication Using
Message Authentication Code
Message
k
3
ليلا Transmit و
¥
۲
۱ ل | وت
IF mac Mac
اي
صفحه 28:
One Way Hash Function
0 Accepts variable size message and
produces fixed size tag (message digest)
0 Advantages of authentication without
encryption
I Encryption is slow
I Encryption hardware expensive
۱ Encryption hardware optimized to large data
I Algorithms covered by patents
I Algorithms subject to export controls (from
USA)
صفحه 29:
Using i Je
3 2
oo face
Hash
صفحه 30:
Secure Hash Functions
0 Hash function must have following
properties:
| Can be applied to any size data block
I Produce fixed length output
I Easy to compute
I Not feasible to reverse
! Not feasible to find two message that give the
same hash
صفحه 31:
SHA-1
0 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
0 Input message less than 2° bits
I Processed in 512 bit blocks
1 Output 160 bit digest
صفحه 32:
Public Key Encryption
0 Based on mathematical algorithms
0 Asymmetric
I Use two separate keys
0 Ingredients
I Plain text
۱ Encryption algorithm
I Public and private key
I Cipher text
! Decryption algorithm
صفحه 33:
Public Key
Encryption
lag
صفحه 34:
Public Key Encryption - Operation
One key made public
I Used for encryption
Other kept private
I Used for decryption
Infeasible to determine decryption key
given encryption key and algorithm
Either key can be used for encryption, the
other for decryption
ص
ص
ص
oa
صفحه 35:
Steps
0 User generates pair of keys
0 User places one key in public domain
0 To send a message to user, encrypt using
public key
0 User decrypts using private key
صفحه 36:
Digital Signature
Sender encrypts message with their
private key
Receiver can decrypt using sneders public
key
This authenticates sender, who is only
person who has the matching key
Does not give privacy of data
! Decrypt key is public
ص
ص
ص
ص
صفحه 37:
Key Generation
and both prime
0
4 mad (a)
KUS (en)
KR
Enerypiion
Msn
C= Me mod
Decryption
ضار اي
«- ۱۷۵-۱
px
Calcul 009
Punic key
Private key
Ciphenext
phen
RSA Algorithm
صفحه 38:
RSA Example
Plaintext
[> 9
Decryption
01.06.40! with]
4 remainder of]
9
127.240
Eneryption
yy 20807 with a
2476009 _ Temainder off
od
وذ ناک
Plaintext
19— ped)
صفحه 39:
IPv4 and IPv6 Security
0 IPSec
0 Secure branch office connectivity over
Internet
0 Secure remote access over Internet
0 Extranet and intranet connectivity
0 Enhanced electronic commerce security
صفحه 40:
IPSec Scope
0 Authentication header
0 Encapsulated security payload
0 Key exchange
0 RFC 2401,2402,2406,2408
صفحه 41:
Security Association
0 One way relationship between sender and
receiver
0 For two way, two associations are required
0 Three SA identification parameters
I Security parameter index
I IP destination address
I Security protocol identifier
صفحه 42:
SA Parameters
Sequence number counter
Sequence counter overflow
Anti-reply windows
AH information
ESP information
Lifetime of this association
IPSec protocol mode
۱ Tunnel, transport or wildcard
Path MTU
SS) Sh ey or ea
oa
صفحه 43:
Transport and Tunnel Modes
0 Transport mode
I Protection for upper layer protocols
1١ Extends to payload of IP packet
I End to end between hosts
1 Tunnel mode
I Protection for IP packet
| Entire packet treated as payload for outer IP
“packet”
۱ No routers examine inner packet
I May have different source and destination address
1 May be implemented at firewall
صفحه 44:
Authentication Header
0
31
Next Header | Payload Length
RESERVED
Security Parameters Index (SPI)
Sequence Number
Authentication Data (variable)
Bit:
صفحه 45:
Encapsulating Security Payload
۱
0 Confidentiality services
صفحه 46:
ESP Packet
Bit: ف 16 24
Security Parameters Index (SPI)
Sequence Number
Payload Data (variable)
Padding (0 - 255 bytes)
Pad Length | Next Header
Authentication Coverage o>
—Contiaentiatiy Coverage جا
Authentication Data (variable)
صفحه 47:
Scope of ESP
Iva
orig IP
Mir | TCP Data
IP Packet
1ه ۰
ل هاري هه
اد ]تا 5 و origi? esp]
wet V har [har trir fauth}
(b) Transport Mode
authenticates
+ neryptea يطل
۳
و
صفحه 48:
Key Management
0 Manual
J Automatic
۲
| Oakley key determination protocol
0 Internet security association and key management
protocol
صفحه 49:
Required Reading
0 Stallings chapter 18