Philosophy of Science

صفحه 1:
Ouversity DP Outs, Dark 02-6 , 2000© Gat Pb (Professor of Pronto @hivsophy, Ouversipy oP dpudshya, Soi VF, soci.pihbstrre7 @belstah.Fi) 

صفحه 2:
Course proynnne ٠ Ded, Dack @: Obst is sviewe? The svieuiPic ‏اس‎ Dke vies ond yous oP svieue. Daturcisa und retaivisw,. ۰ Dru, Dack 9: Phe issue oP ‏لته‎ redisw. Aeteoduciag progpemaist philyepphy oP svicare (ia retatiod to the redo issue ord your). ٠ Cr, Dack 91 Praxpvatisw (oad its history) io the phospho? ‏له سوت لین لت )یی‎ ‏صاج ,تا‎ — Dhe ponivipoots ooo presect their pw brieP papers, 

صفحه 3:
۰ ‏ات0 و۵‎ "tede”, "svieta’): ‏رو متسه با‎ = he research prowess = he resulslovuieuis oP svieuiic research (he svieuiic workbiew) ° "Guiewr is systewatic, rofivod! osquistica oP ce ‏.ای‎ ((heaparccta & Dircihuviz) = Ohetis (sew, previously uokwwa) huowkke? (he chesicd ‏عسي‎ ‎DP ‏:ارس‎ iusiPied true belek) = Oho ‏ما روط‎ sviewse wad ee where)? = Whee spetewuticiy (jo sieuce ued cbewhere)? مد او - اه راشای ,نموه لها ,لوا ری * سره متسود 

صفحه 4:
۱6 ۲7۲۲۱ 77 * Cotecce (oad Peckwkpy) Gtudies (SPC): taterdsrizkrary, ‎P ).‏ #توصاصكاتها لمه ججمجاعد نا اطعا ‎Okt exaniy‏ - ها ۱ ‎ewpiricd).‏ ‎= Phe ‏و ار وان‎ does ‏و راو‎ Posts che ¢ srr ‏اطع بط‎ whol scieuce cach iy be the. (OP. the ‏زمره‎ of ‏روص فارطا ‎Pore bebePs but wits how we‏ لهچ جروت اس اوه صز اه ‎our beket is.)‏ بكلاصم ‎Pore ord‏ تايس 

صفحه 5:
(Phivsvphy oP sviewe und other ureus oP phivsophy *) @roblews to the phipsophy oP sciewse ure deeply ‏وی‎ wit other philssophicd problecws, ‏:كج‎ ‎= Detaphysice: do the objects ‏اه راو اما او مه و‎ ver (ord oF ‏رما مقس‎ etv.)? (Nhe probe of redisw.) = Cpetewriy: whol ts sviecihic honwedke? ((Phicsophy of ‏مه موه‎ bee sees ‏اس رومام ای تام مرو و مه‎ spent exes oP ‏اس سوه‎ ( = Dowie! what (vakd) srieciic Pereace tive? له ما مس و وه بل توا اه روا ‎trv or‏ موجهل ‎rePer to iadepeadeaty existe euies, oad are‏ 0[ ‎Rabe (a the correspoadeare sree)?‏ = @kics oad pottical phicsophyt & scieuse ‏حابن رسای و سای‎ fet oP rehired cert srt ‏و موه و ما‎ = @hicsophy of rekon: does soieare reP ute rebyirr? 

صفحه 6:
نی ان روام‌مسوزط) ‎qeurrd ud speviul‏ @everd phivsophy oP sviews! problews cowed to of ‏تمه‎ ‎disviplues (iactudy the hucvouiies): tru, iPereue, explacatiog ‏میج‎ Pir. Gpecid problesws ia retoioe to dPPeredt svieditic disvipiues, r. حا عجان عدت سفن لجس قفي ‎(Phivsophy of wahewutos! de‏ = swutkedaticdl truth? 35 ‏بعسعه أ مسو اسع جو سور سسا امسو‎ اه اه رال جما ‎of We,‏ سوه حصا :نووصاماطا شان بوامصوصاد!0) = جملا اه وود ‎oP the post, the‏ رو با ترا اه روا او جوا ,امن با مورا ‎inukvalues oP chairs‏ و بط ,مه له تاو وه ‎of edison:‏ روط ‎etc.?‏ .ونا 

صفحه 7:
= ‏هایس‎ ond ‏نصا‎ ore oot son Por there oust sche. — freinnmeddtiow: kunwiecke koe poly ireirocrectal vokir, ct reer ‏سا‎ 0۵ = ‘Prt (homuutecke) & uckicbe oe sunk, Por ts pura sche ‏سس‎ vo). — OP. soso redsw! here bo ‏تراهط سب او‎ CPs, oad srieure ors of ‏بل‎ out what i's the. 

صفحه 8:
٠ OO woderde ‏راهمجممطود ع9 موم اتود ما وله شوه‎ valuable ood upphouble to practical problew-solvie, eves thous the priory wotivativa Por seehioy hoowledye is ut iostrvectal ۱ vurivsity. * @usic research: howledgeliruks Por its puva sake. — Gordes ue of re (or ruhthe) heores obou he way he world ‏يها‎ * Oppled research: ‏ردو‎ volvable hoowledye, upplicable ‏صا‎ ‎provticd problews. = Opp ing he resus oP busic research, svicuists ‏مق اه علقي ةاجن دجيف‎ to various problews we Pace it cur practices. = "Qesin sviewe” (Dickow): desiqnay ‏ها موه و‎ u pracicd problew, etc. 

صفحه 9:
Goiewe ud uso interests 8 Ringed Woberwes! coturd svieuce is wotivated by o teckoicdl foterest (qoverciay ature), he hua sviewes by a ‏موه وه‎ interest (lberoticg ‏موی و وم‎ ‏چا خاه ال سا رصوله تشه امسطو) سامت موه‎ ‏ری )"مساو‎ Workkever). ۱ iedepesdtedt oP teckoicd dowicaticd oP ature possible ot ol? — © wopr issue io sview» ued ‏.تام نو اوه‎ Gkould svieuiPic researc ‏مود‎ be seu os a tool Por busiwess, cad soviet ki ‏لسعو‎ ‎— Dhe vole-ldewuess vs. volue-iedepeodeuse oF svieuiPic research (we wil retura to this problew ia dur course). 

صفحه 10:
Oppled ‏موه‎ ۰ ‏راو‎ the results oP applied researck ore unt thevreticad stitewedits ubout the way the world is (as ia basic research) but ‏صا ادمرب بر :وه ولمم‎ achieve youl, ‏امه تور مج‎ ‏و‎ (cP. vod Orkt (G09). = AP pou wad ty ure « poled wik od kPeviva, pou pucht iy use catbirios. = AP pow wad ‏اص سرع نيا موسو روات جد‎ Per pour custear bowb, pou puch tp buikd a like this... ارت اه لنوت سوه ورس ما ارت مت و بط .0.0 + ‎Nhere ty days roo Por‏ اف ‎oy based we wt wordy‏ موی مج اجه ,سیم و نمهب و ‎udkrticad deresica of what hied of‏ — ‏ره نطو‎ hue rufkvolues! they ore true or Pulse stoteweuts ‏واه‎ ‎he retatoas betwera ukvs aed he weuus uevessary Por uckieviey those 55-3 

صفحه 11:
اوه له وا مرن ماو وه بو و() ۰ reseurck in, exp, he Polpwiey svieuitic disviplives: — Dediice - @yricuhurd sview? — Education — Potticd sviewe = AWistory (oP ideas) ٠ 4s it dhuwoys possible to drow uo cleo distociion betvero basic ood upped research? ‏مرو ,حون‎ the wost "basic" research problews witht be wotvated by the potectial opplicabiipy oP the results oP research. 

صفحه 12:
© Cows eto: epistewe (hu wiedke) us. tebtrer (shill). — Pevkaloqy: tehbor + ype, "the study/doviriee oP shits”. 41s teckarloyy just upplied sviewe, or the poustructioa oP opplicaicas upon upphed research? Or is (ooutewporery) ‏هتسه سوه‎ depecdedt vo tect? — Goiews (day) cevessody requries ‏.عدصت أدصكصاصكامجا ه‎ - Revwbyy coo be urdersiond very brody (oP. doba Dewep, beny ‘Wickwen): cay tools ioteliqewtly used to provi huevert purposes ore techurlogical — tochudiary, e-g., hrc. * Phipsyphy oP teckurlowpy studies the catune oP ‏ای از مامتها یی‎ اه موه ع و جر ۳ مرج( ‎(Qewry, ‘Lickcan).‏ © Gotiewe ocd teconlogy studies? tobtay serivusly the tevlavloyical coctext oP woders sviewe. Ooreraiviy? 

صفحه 13:
اسب امه ۳ ٠ ‏جلا جز إمجا(ل) #جخالمجامد جاصعصوصر جز ددا(‎ dePiciiza oP, or the: ‏امه ,سا اس‎ wetkod’? * ‏او امه لا عه با طسو مصاج‎ © Dke problew of dewrarmation (Kad Popper (OS®): how to dower betwerd svieure od pseudo-sviewe (.y., wetuphysics — oP. logic exwpirivisw, the Oieoca Circle)? - 0.0. Pseude-sciews wee wt be cooP used wi wwersviewe. Cleat, ‏رتور اه هه را و‎ yropkoby, ۲۹0 ‏رح‎ are ‏ان سي رال‎ ‏مله د مط يه حيو اس ی وا و ع اروت‎ brat PUP ke orierta ‏احاتم عنا نا لمحسه مه تاه تسه و‎ 

صفحه 14:
»]۱۳ ‏لاس نزمه‎ (cod) ۰ ast etfs ) ‏“مسد د‎ wethod), or are there sever? - )( ‏صاصلجحاصب عس) جمطوصبه امس عصام وداج‎ opicvisw): there is ‏امه او وه بان‎ wethod, ood tooo be discovered (CP. logicd exopirivisw, the uaiy oP sviewe wovewent). — QDetkodolodicdl plurdisc: there ore severd dPPeredt, equal vorrent svicditic wethods (e.y., rePlectiogy the diPPereaves of sviewes). — Radic ‏لاه تام‎ coarchisw (Pout ‏اوه" سس‎ qwes!”) — oP. rekiiview. 

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»]۱۳ ‏لاس نزمه‎ (cod) Chores G. Peirce, "Phe Pixctiva oP BeticP” (JOP? ): Pour (d) the wethod oP tecrariy (©) the wethod oP cuthoriy (9) the wetkod oP whol is cqreruble to ‏نش هموح‎ wetkod, the o pripri wethod) () the svieuiPic wethod زج مور امه رود ‎OP wt‏ روط رل ‎erterim‏ © ع ‎hick, hope, et.‏ - One bebe shank be Pec bye” ‏سبحم لصي"‎ "المحدي ذا ما خن لول سا مه وه او سا اس وه و اجان مور تم مسجت با وا ماع( ‎(hick Peirce Poured).‏ 

صفحه 16:
»]۱۳ ‏لاس نزمه‎ (cod) On the busts oP Prince's (oad vikers’) ‏مه عط من ناه‎ wetkod, we swap exophusize the Pollpuien "corer sioces” oF ‏)روط لت‎ piers): وان - — Publicay وحومهة الس - — GeP-corevivewss تون = Proyessvewss robles: who is supposed to set these criteria, Prow whic perspenive, vo what yrurds? Is this the tosh oP the phivsophy DP sviewe, or of the sviediPic ‏وللیی موی‎ research ] ite? = Drexkiond (cuicaepus) vs. ccturdkzed phibsophy of svicae! 

صفحه 17:
۰ ‏وا یی(‎ is op Pirst philpsopkp” — a cutpuowous phivsvphicd persperive over und ubpve svicue seh (D.O. Quine). ° Roker, sviews vad phizsophy (of scieue) west be sero oF ‏موه‎ wis Pack viker. — Dhe problew of vircukriy: P sviewe toe, iestead oP aay prior, sore ‏ی‎ وا موه تا وی و خر و اما ‎DU IORTVE orients, does ١ ave oy Poverciiz ot ol?‏ - AWew does this sitvatioa dPPer Pros, e.x., the ‏اهلد جرا‎ hike thatthe Bible establishes itr owe auhoriy as a sacred tex? * Octurdish choheayes the trediiccd corweive woture oF the phivsophy of scieuce! the worws oP svieuihic research vaca be estublshed Pro vutside svieuce. 

صفحه 18:
Crow vaturdisc 0 ‏۶اه‎ © Oe wo shetck the Policy loose argued ٠ )0( Octurdiisc: there is op First phipsophy thot could woreaively ‏وه مار مس‎ is, or whet it vught to be, Pow o perspective Wag vutside svivue tse. (Prewise.) : yecerd phivsophicd ۳ were pseudo-problew. (Polos Pro (1). Phe structure oP tke unnpedt could be wade wore explicit by oddiag the prewise that the oriterta oP sviewe vod cy be setled either svieure-intercrly Dr svirure-extercly.) 

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‎(coud)‏ دددان ۲ 9 اهنت م۳ ‎(0) Chere ‏و ری لح و‎ oF the Kistoricd phase of the ‏و او وه و وس وه راو‎ shares whol i (pod, proper, ‏باه ,(0) اجه () مجاهت سوه (م‎ ‏سا و موه وا تن اهامای رو‎ deat pests.) (8) Chere oe, nthe hetry of ‏بصوب اس وه تسد الط وه‎ ‏موه تس‎ of the orienta oP (cord, proper, correrd) scieare ocd of ‏و توا ی و موه وم مص بجي و تور‎ of Peat, ‏مرا‎ . Cat parenkprm, soiree ‏هام‎ ( (8) Therefore, we wast aocept ‏مرها‎ the oniterta of srieare (cr ‏و رو‎ rekive to the historical stage oF scieare (or a paniokae sviedPir devipkar), u ((Cuboiea) parudkey, u perspevive pr pool oP view, 3 ration, o bool scully oxi, 0 uke, a sped cox! or sere cher that wohes tt posable Por ‏خی‎ io pursue their decipher. (Poke Pron (2) ond (#).) 

صفحه 20:
(Prow ‏مارا 0 متسه‎ (coud) Dke ore ubove is unt strictly deductively valid but ot Pasi be trocsPorwed into a wore explicit, ‏تمه لا راو هصن جلك‎ by oiddicy rehively obvious prewises. i seews thot relaiview Polls Proce the coturaist decial oF there the worwolve criteria oF the svieciPic wethod. Cholleoge! is there a wide ycued optic available, ‏وی ه‎ Por oF coturdisc wis wo reodicdly reliivist couse quedces? (Oe'l exaiee this issue fo ‏ماو‎ io ‏بولطم اج‎ of ‏.ند‎ ( 

صفحه 21:
رشاو خام جووسرص ”) Oord retaivisc Coxnitive rehtivisc = Couephed (vapbyrd) relive = Percept reiivisw (cP. he hear ood coacepHadeucess oF observe) ‎(retaivicw abut truth)‏ رما ال ‎otters oF‏ اس واه ال تیاه شا شا مورا ‎retiree)‏ ‎Ov exhaustive survey oP dPRered rehtivisws is possible here. ‎Oor ov 11 ioplicg thot word ood ‏ارت وضو شوه‎ ‎ws be costly distacuishuble. ‏ی موه ,لصو رای ‎"Relive to...”‏ 

صفحه 22:
(#مكنهمادم أن جدمتمصججمه رون ‎oe DP‏ شاه موی تن .0.0 رسمه عمط ۳:۵ QO. Ceperubeud: ucarchiow, "copihiy yes”, ‏وود‎ wethod” سای رصم مرو الم ترس ‎QR.‏ O. Proc! caturd veiployical atitude (DO) Ol these (very dPPerect) upprouckes — ta the phipsvphy oP ‏وت‎ ‎cand elsewhere — risk lostey troes-multurdl ced tecas-paradigeratie ‏و وت لها زره‎ dew) exavples oP ‏لا دكت مشاه مج‎ ۱ rekttivists! (Buen ‏راصح" مصجا مها موه تم هو‎ every ierbiva is ll ای ارام مرو جا ما خر موه موه ‎tre?‏ امه ‎Phiv): te rehiview were‏ )موه مایب = 

صفحه 23:
° Dke problew of rehiiview ts 0 ovestoct choleage tc the phivsophy DP sview, espevidty coturdized phipsuphy oP sviewe rejection trodtiiccdl "Pirst philpsopkp”. 411 cacast be avoided; cor skoukd we siwply suo to retaivisw. * Octuraists ane right to reject way ubsvhutely cuiowswous, svieweE- exterod "Pirst phiysvphy”, but hey risk som Picton oorcativiiy ord ‏ولج‎ up wits (rocicd) retativisc. ° Oe west oooinuvusl seek the widde youd: ‏تاره و‎ adequate coturdisc, a Porc of cotucdiss whick ‏دن جاح‎ (but werely reierprets or revouveptudizes) the tretiiccrad wrwdive task of the phipsvphy oF sviewsr. 

صفحه 24:
Pragwutst philpsophy oP sview er * @raxpvotisw is vor trodiica io the philsophy oP ‏وتو‎ ‎(ced philvsophy wore yecerdy) thot hopes to oPRer suck u widde youd. ٠ Chesicd prageuist phipsophers (oP svieure): — OG. Peirce — the svieuiPic wetkod — Otho dawes — perkups ‏اه و تسوا و‎ Pields (&.u., ‏رم خن روهار‎ - ‏اه تسوا تاه موه تاه - روررو(ا) ول‎ iaquiry — GW. Dead — prexpvatsdw oad the soci sviewes — Devprenpvatists: Rony, Witaqy Putco, et of. 

صفحه 25:
له رانا رعنومومم(۳) وتو ‎oP‏ وس عاا Co ‏فص اه جر وا - مه (ططل) وه مور‎ or ‎is a trubs-serbiay ctv?‏ مجهت وجل سام نجل لمات بول سمو ‏( ماه جر )و اه روبص و6 ‎019 desorpive quesion: hay svieuce bees, or should abe, ‏ه‎ ‎inuk-sechiny anivip; have ‏صاصادجي سم‎ believed iio be, oad shoud they have? ‎Ron's phaoordits! secrets ("we hove to stat Brow where we oe”) ‎roma Por tree‏ کارت ره او سا موه و رل با و ‎niki corwaiviy, oad thereby wih 07 resources to ‏مره راوج‎ ‏امنا تممه تر ملس ‎Rony spews tp rekice episiewic (svieuiPir)‏ = ‎Pro‏ و طسو ره وه و و متسر ‎where we ae...).‏ ‎= Cues Rony wil hove ‏وا‎ use ‏او ره‎ 

صفحه 26:
Pragwutst philpsophy oP sview er (coud) ٠ Gower avootages of progemaiss (to be discussed ict swore dete hater): — Ooderde cotucdisc: svieuve is pot oP the ooturd work, + Op sharp cuir vy. vulture dickviowy. * Oorwaiviy co ‏ی با‎ ("served cature” Por us, us the ‏خام لس‎ rotund betes we are — of. loko OoDowell). + Cwerpur? — @otireduntiocisc, phucdiss7: op "ucity oP sviease” but the 

صفحه 27:
Praguutst philpsophy DE sviewe (coud) ٠ Odvoctages oP pregevaiica (ovat): + Dke rediow four wil, tc the Polowieg, be adopted os the cat ‏سوه مادام‎ Por ke deReuse ofa preceratet opproack ie ike phibsopky oP svirure. — Pobiog serivusly the sovio-historicd (iacludioy techuvtyicdl) podtents oF svieure und foquiry (oP. Dewey, Wickwar, et ul). + Perks even (ube oon be interpreted oo proceratet? 

صفحه 28:
Pragwutst philpsophy oP sview er (coud) * @raxpvoisw, however, dsv kas its problexws: — Is the progeotists’ wap oP ypiacy bepood the reise vs. ‏موه مه‎ suovessPul, or does it oolopse back to ‏باه اه ,مشاه مرش وه ,اهر‎ ele? (OP. ‏مها ولمم‎ declisw.) — Wow coo we adequately uficuate ‏وتو عا‎ wrwuiviy (oP svieure) pragevaiists iuist va? — Dhere is ww short vat to wordier the problews of reltiview ood coturdisa. ued progpwutst phivsophy oP sviewe ‏اه‎ ‏له له عم راو مره عا مهو میم‎ oP possibitiy, to critica dialogue wits other upprouches ic the phivsophy oF sviewe. 

صفحه 29:
Dewey, J. (IOC9), Phe Quest For Oertaay, Prowisk trowstaics by ۳۰ ‏و05‎ ‎Ourkkeys voruuters, Canes, Webichi, JOO9. Peyerched, P.(IO?S), Pyatet Detod, Orrse, beeen. Pre, 0. (O99), The Chub Bae, rev. ed. (st ed. (O09), Vhe Daversiy oF ‏صرحا‎ Press, Ohixxp. dawes, D. (JOOP), Progwuisw, Wavad OP, Canbrike, OB, ISS. (The ‏حول ما و لو‎ IO vk, Warrard OP, 0۵۰ ) Kuba, P.G. (IOP O), The Grrurture of Grieuihic Revokious, Oud ed. ((st ed. (908), The Ouversiy of Chinnp Press, Chirag. ‎Crit GrieuiPic Reatew, OrPord DP, OrPord.‏ ,(1999) 1۰ ,مسا ‎] 0.6. (I990-G0), Onlerted Papers, O ute, Warvard OP, Ouwbrike, OO. ‎Perce, C.5. (IO98-90), The Bssratd Prive, © vole, aco DP, bowicxioa. ‎] 6. (1999), Girructurtay te Dork, Bota Phivsephica Penica SO, Detstab. ‎(COO9), Oaurutziay the Trosceadeud, Wucaiiy/Prowehes‏ .6 متا ‎@ovks, Pokerst, DS’.‏ 

صفحه 30:
Gueoygested ۲ (coct'd) Popper, KR. ((OS9), The Lovie of CriewtPic Discovery (OOF), ‏بل‎ ‎Lodo. Popper, WR. (999), ‏لا لاه( ویو( لو موس‎ Prey, W. (O90), Reakew wit o Wud Pace, Waverd OP, Cuvbriceer, OO. Prt, W. (JOOS), Prageatew: Pa Oped Question, Blachwel, OxPord. Prev, W. (COOP), The Ortlaper of the Pact/Odue Dickoirny, Warvard DP, Oxrrbricee, OB. Quine, 0.0. (1999), Outebaird Reta, oad Otker Bary, Orkrobia OP, Dew ‘York. Quine, 0.0. (1998), Prow Grohe te Griewr, Waverd OP, Cavbridge, OO. Rory, R. (IOP 9), Phibsephy ood the Dior of Date, Priaceios OP, Priccetva, Ou. Rory, R. (1988), Orwequewes of Propratsw, Worvester Press, Brichioa. Rory, R. (1990), Prue cod Prowess, Ouvbrike OP, Cacvbrictce. 

Philosophy of Science University of Oulu, March 4-6, 2009 Sami Pihlström (Professor of Practical Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, sami.j.pihlstro m@jyu.fi , sami.pihlstrom@helsinki.fi) Course program • Wed, March 4: What is science? The scientific method. The aims and goals of science. Naturalism and relativism. • Thu, March 5: The issue of scientific realism. Introducing pragmatist philosophy of science (in relation to the realism issue and generally). • Fri, March 6: Pragmatism (and its history) in the philosophy of science. Science and values, science and religion, etc. – The participants can present their own brief papers, discussing their own research problems and methodology from a philosophical perspective. What is science? • ”Science” (”Wissenschaft”, ”tiede”, ”scientia”): – the scientific community – the research process – the results/contents of scientific research (the scientific worldview) • ”Science is systematic, rational acquisition of new knowledge.” (Haaparanta & Niiniluoto) – What is (new, previously unknown) knowledge? (the classical conception of knowledge: justified true belief) – What is rationality (in science and elsewhere)? – What is systematicity (in science and elsewhere)? • E.g., ontological, logical, explanatory, institutional, etc. – different dimensions of scientific systematicity. Perspectives on science • Science (and Technology) Studies (STS): interdisciplinary, empirically informed research on the nature of science, including history, sociology, and philosophy of science (and technology). – What exactly is the relation between science and technology? • Philosophy of Science: normative vs. descriptive (factual, empirical). – The philosopher of science doesn’t merely describe facts about science but tries to determine what science ought to be like. (Cf. the normativity of epistemological theories of knowledge and justification, etc.: epistemology is not just concerned with the ways we actually form beliefs but with how we ought to form and justify our beliefs.) Philosophy of science and other areas of philosophy • Problems in the philosophy of science are deeply connected with other philosophical problems, e.g.: – Metaphysics: do the objects of scientific research exist independently of us (and of scientific theories, etc.)? (The problem of realism.) – Epistemology: what is scientific knowledge? (Philosophy of science can be seen as the application of general epistemology to the special case of scientific knowledge.) – Logic: what is (valid) scientific inference like? – Philosophy of language: do scientific theories (theoretical terms and concepts) refer to independently existing entities, and are theories true or false (in the correspondence sense)? – Ethics and political philosophy: is science value-free or value-laden; what kind of ethical and social problems do science involve? – Philosophy of religion: does science refute religion? Philosophy of science: general and special • General philosophy of science: problems common to all scientific disciplines (including the humanities): truth, inference, explanation (vs. understanding), etc. • Special problems in relation to different scientific disciplines, e.g.: – Philosophy of mathematics: do mathematical entities exist, what is mathematical truth? – Philosophy of physics: time and space, the interpretation of quantum theory? – Philosophy of biology: the nature of life, the reality of species? – Philosophy of history: the reality of the past, the determinacy of the truthvalues of claims about the past, historical explanation? – Philosophy of education: the scientific worldview and education, the science vs. religion issue, etc.? The aims and goals of science • Cognitivism: Science aims at knowledge and/or truth about the world (classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief). – Truth (knowledge) is valuable as such, for its own sake (intrinsic value). – Cf. scientific realism: there is a world out there, independently of us, and science aims at finding out what it’s like. • Behavioralism: Science aims at practical recommendations and problem-solving. – Knowledge and truth are not sought for their own sake. – Instrumentalism: knowledge has only instrumental value, not intrinsic value. (N.B. In a more specific sense, instrumentalism denies that scientific theories have truthvalues.) Basic and applied research • A moderate cognitivist admits that knowledge can be instrumentally valuable and applicable to practical problem-solving, even though the primary motivation for seeking knowledge is not instrumental but, e.g., pure intellectual curiosity. • Basic research: knowledge/truth for its own sake. – Scientists aim at true (or truthlike) theories about the way the world is. • Applied research: instrumentally valuable knowledge, applicable to practical problems. – Applying the results of basic research, scientists aim at workable solutions to various problems we face in our practices. – ”Design science” (Niiniluoto): designing a solution to a practical problem, etc. Science and human interests • Jürgen Habermas: natural science is motivated by a technical interest (governing nature), the human sciences by a hermeneutical interest (understanding), and critical social theory by an emancipatory interest (liberating humans from domination structures, etc.). – Background: Frankfurt School cultural critique, the ”dialectics of the enlightenment” (Adorno, Horkheimer). • Is ”pure” natural science independent of technical domination of nature possible at all? – A major issue in science and technology policy. Should scientific research simply be seen as a tool for business, and society in general? – The value-ladenness vs. value-independence of scientific research (we will return to this problem in due course). Applied research • Typically, the results of applied research are not theoretical statements about the way the world is (as in basic research) but ”technical norms”: if you want to achieve goal X, then you ought to do Y (cf. von Wright 1963). – If you want to cure a patient with an infection, you ought to use antibiotics. – If you want to achieve maximum destructive potential for your nuclear bomb, you ought to build it like this… • N.B. The interests upon which the technical norms arrived at in applied research are based are not morally neutral! There is always room for valuational discussion of what kind of interests we ought to pursue, and why. – Technical norms have truthvalues: they are true or false statements about the relations between aims and the means necessary for achieving those aims. Applied research (continued) • We might consider the relation between basic and applied research in, e.g., the following scientific disciplines: – – – – – – Medicine Agricultural science Education Political science History (of ideas) Aesthetics (and art education) … • Is it always possible to draw a clear distinction between basic and applied research? Sometimes, even the most ”basic” research problems might be motivated by the potential applicability of the results of research. Science and technology • Some etymology: episteme (knowledge) vs. tekhne (skill). – Technology: tekhne + logos, ”the study/doctrine of skills”. • Is technology just applied science, or the construction of applications based upon applied research? Or is (contemporary) science crucially dependent on technology? – Science (today) necessarily requries a technological context. – Tecnology can be understood very broadly (cf. John Dewey, Larry Hickman): any tools intelligently used to promote human purposes are technological – including, e.g., language. • Philosophy of technology studies the nature of our technological culture. Technopessimism (Heidegger) vs. moderate optimism, meliorism (Dewey, Hickman). • Science and technology studies: taking seriously the technological context of modern science. Normativity? The scientific method • When is research scientific? What is the definition of, or the criteria for, ”the scientific method”? • Is there such a thing as the ”scientific method”? • The problem of demarcation (Karl Popper 1934): how to demarcate between science and pseudo-science (e.g., metaphysics – cf. logical empiricism, the Vienna Circle)? – N.B. Pseudo-science must not be confused with non-science. Clearly non-scientific human practices, e.g., art or sport, are not pseudo-scientific, whereas practices/”disciplines” like astrology, graphology, creationism, spiritual healing, anthroposophy, etc., are usually taken to be. – Not everything must be made scientific, but practices/disciplines that do not fulfill the criteria for scientificity should not pretend to be scientific. The scientific method (cont’d) • Is there a single correct scientific method (the scientific method), or are there several? – Methodological monism (or methodological optimism): there is only one correct scientific method, and it can be discovered (cf. logical empiricism, the unity of science movement). – Methodological pluralism: there are several different, equally correct scientific methods (e.g., reflecting the differences of various disciplines, such as the natural and the human sciences). – Radical pluralism: methodological anarchism (Paul Feyerabend: ”anything goes!”) – cf. relativism. The scientific method (cont’d) • Charles S. Peirce, ”The Fixation of Belief” (1877): four different ways of fixing beliefs about the world. • (1) the method of tenacity • (2) the method of authority • (3) the method of what is agreeable to reason (the intuitive method, the a priori method) • (4) the scientific method – A criterion for reality: independence of what any number of persons may think, hope, etc. – Our beliefs should be fixed by an ”external permanency”. – Yet, the world may not be independent of ”thought in general”. – We’ll return to the issue of realism within pragmatist philosophy of science (which Peirce founded). The scientific method (cont’d) • On the basis of Peirce’s (and others’) reflections on the scientific method, we may emphasize the following ”corner stones” of scientific rationality (among others): – – – – – – Objectivity Publicity Critical thinking Self-correctiveness Autonomy Progressiveness • Problem: who is supposed to set these criteria, from which perspective, on what grounds? Is this the task of the philosophy of science, or of the scientific community and/or research process itself? – Traditional (autonomous) vs. naturalized philosophy of science! Naturalism and relativism • Naturalism: ”there is no first philosophy” – no autonomous philosophical perspective over and above science itself (W.V. Quine). • Rather, science and philosophy (of science) must be seen as continuous with each other. – The problem of circularity: if science itself, instead of any prior, more fundamental philosophical theory of the nature of science, establishes its own normative criteria, does it have any foundation at all? – How does this situation differ from, e.g., the religious fundamentalists’ claim that the Bible establishes its own authority as a sacred text? • Naturalism challenges the traditional normative nature of the philosophy of science: the norms of scientific research cannot be established from outside science. From naturalism to relativism? • We may sketch the following loose argument: • (1) Naturalism: there is no first philosophy that could normatively determine what science is, or what it ought to be, from a perspective lying outside science itself. (Premise.) • (2) Therefore, science itself determines its own criteria. In particular, the problem of demarcation (between science and pseudo-science of metaphysics) can be settled only scienceinternally; if understood as a general philosophical problem, it is a mere pseudo-problem. (Follows from (1). The structure of the argument could be made more explicit by adding the premise that the criteria of science can only be settled either science-internally or science-externally.) From naturalism to relativism (cont’d) • (3) There is no ahistorical criterion, independent of the historical phase of the development of science (or a particular scientific discipline), for determining what is (good, proper, correct) science. (Follows from (1) and (2), at least by adding the obvious premise that science is a historically developing phenomenon.) • (4) There are, in the history of science, radically divergent stages with very different conceptions of the criteria of (good, proper, correct) science and of the science vs. pseudo-science demarcation. (Premise, a historical statement of fact. Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn: paradigms, scientific revolutions.) • (5) Therefore, we must accept relativism: the criteria of science (and demarcation) are relative to the historical stage of science (or a particular scientific discipline), a (Kuhnian) paradigm, a perspective or point of view, a tradition, a local scientific community, a culture, a social context, or some other ”background” that makes it possible for scientists to pursue their disciplines. (Follows from (3) and (4).) From naturalism to relativism (cont’d) • The argument above is not strictly deductively valid but can easily be transformed into a more explicit, deductively valid argument by adding relatively obvious premises. • It seems that relativism follows from the naturalist denial of there being any foundational ”first philosophy” which would determine the normative criteria of the scientific method. • Challenge: is there a middle ground option available, a moderate form of naturalism with no radically relativist consequences? (We’ll examine this issue in relation to pragmatist philosophy of science.) Forms of relativism • Moral relativism • Cognitive relativism – Conceptual (ontological) relativism – Perceptual relativism (cf. the theory- and concept-ladenness of observation) – Alethic relativism (relativism about truth) – Logical relativism (relativism about valid inference or the criteria of rationality) – … • No exhaustive survey of different relativisms is possible here. Nor am I implying that moral and cognitive relativisms would always be easily distinguishable. • ”Relative to…” – culture, paradigm, conceptual scheme… Examples of relativist philosophy of science… • • • • • • • … or of overhasty accusations of relativism? W.V. Quine: ontological relativity T.S. Kuhn: paradigms, incommensurability P. Feyerabend: anarchism, ”anything goes”, ”against method” R. Rorty: radical neopragmatism, ethnocentrism A. Fine: natural ontological attitude (NOA) All these (very different) approaches – in the philosophy of science and elsewhere – risk losing trans-cultural and trans-paradigmatic normativity, but none are clearly examples of radical relativism; on the contrary, these thinkers typically deny that they are relativists! – Even Feyerabend rejects relativism, because ”potentially every tradition is all traditions”. – Accusing someone of relativism is always problematic, contextual. – The reflexive charge (cf. Plato): is relativism merely relatively true? Naturalism and relativism (summing up) • The problem of relativism is a constant challenge in the philosophy of science, especially naturalized philosophy of science rejecting traditional ”first philosophy”. It cannot be avoided; nor should we simply succumb to relativism. • Naturalists are right to reject any absolutely autonomous, scienceexternal ”first philosophy”, but they risk sacrificing normativity and ending up with (radical) relativism. • We must continuously seek the middle ground: a normatively adequate naturalism, a form of naturalism which doesn’t give up (but merely reinterprets or reconceptualizes) the traditional normative task of the philosophy of science. Pragmatist philosophy of science • Pragmatism is one tradition in the philosophy of science (and philosophy more generally) that hopes to offer such a middle ground. • Classical pragmatist philosophers (of science): – C.S. Peirce – the scientific method – William James – perhaps more important in other fields (e.g., philosophy of religion) – John Dewey – naturalist, experimentalist theory of inquiry – G.H. Mead – pragmatism and the social sciences – Neopragmatists: Rorty, Hilary Putnam, et al. Pragmatism, truth, and the goals of science • Can pragmatists accept (moderate) cognitivism – ”science aims at truth” – or must they abandon the idea that science is a truth-seeking activity? – Rorty: truth is not a goal of inquiry. (Truth vs. justification.) • Again: normative vs. descriptive question: has science been, or should it be, a truth-seeking activity; have pragmatists believed it to be, and should they have? • Rorty’s ethnocentrist neopragmatism (”we have to start from where we are”) is in the danger of collapsing into radical relativism, with no room for transcultural normativity, and thereby with no resources to distinguish, even contextually, science from pseudo-science. – Rorty seems to reduce epistemic (scientific) justification to mere local justification for a particular scientific community (we have to start from where we are…). – Even Rorty will have to use normative concepts! Pragmatist philosophy of science (cont’d) • Some advantages of pragmatism (to be discussed in more detail later): – Moderate naturalism: science is part of the natural world, along with everything else. • No sharp nature vs. culture dichotomy. • Normativity can be maintained (”second nature” for us, as the kind of natural beings we are – cf. John McDowell). • Emergence? – Antireductionism, pluralism: no ”unity of science” but the plurality of perspectives, standpoints, and worldviews (cf. W. James’s pluralistic pragmatism: science, ethics, religion, … all relevant to human concerns). Pragmatist philosophy of science (cont’d) • Advantages of pragmatism (cont’d): – Transcending the realism vs. antirealism opposition: a pragmatic realism as a synthesis of scientific realism and its (constructivist, relativist) alternatives (cf. Putnam)? • The realism issue will, in the following, be adopted as the main philosophical context for the defense of a pragmatist approach in the philosophy of science. – Taking seriously the socio-historical (including technological) contexts of science and inquiry (cf. Dewey, Hickman, et al.). • Perhaps even Kuhn can be interpreted as a pragmatist? Pragmatist philosophy of science (cont’d) • Pragmatism, however, also has its problems: – Is the pragmatists’ way of going beyond the realism vs. antirealism controversy successful, or does it collapse back to idealism, constructivism, relativism, or something else? (Cf. Kant’s transcendental idealism.) – How can we adequately articulate the practice-internal normativity (of science) pragmatists insist on? – There is no short cut to avoiding the problems of relativism and naturalism. Even pragmatist philosophy of science must continuously re-examine its own starting points and conditions of possibility, in critical dialogue with other approaches in the philosophy of science. Suggested reading • • • • • • • • • • Dewey, J. (1929), The Quest for Certainty, Finnish translation by P. Määttänen: Pyrkimys varmuuteen, Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 1999. Feyerabend, P. (1975), Against Method, Verso, London. Fine, A. (1996), The Shaky Game, rev. ed. (1st ed. 1986), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. James, W. (1907), Pragmatism, Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA, 1975. (The Works of William James, 19 vols, Harvard UP, 1975-88.) Kuhn, T.S. (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (1st ed. 1962), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Niiniluoto, I. (1999), Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford UP, Oxford. Peirce, C.S. (1931-58), Collected Papers, 8 vols, Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA. Peirce, C.S. (1992-98), The Essential Peirce, 2 vols, Indiana UP, Bloomington. Pihlström, S. (1996), Structuring the World, Acta Philosophica Fennica 59, Helsinki. Pihlström, S. (2003), Naturalizing the Trascendental, Humanity/Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY. Suggested reading (cont’d) • • • • • • • • • • Popper, K.R. (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934), Routledge, London. Popper, K.R. (1963), Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London. Putnam, H. (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA. Putnam, H. (1995), Pragmatism: An Open Question, Blackwell, Oxford. Putnam, H. (2002), The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA. Quine, W.V. (1969), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia UP, New York. Quine, W.V. (1995), From Stimulus to Science, Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA. Rorty, R. (1979), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton UP, Princeton, NJ. Rorty, R. (1982), Consequences of Pragmatism, Harvester Press, Brighton. Rorty, R. (1998), Truth and Progress, Cambridge UP, Cambridge.